by Dr V. A. Gunasekara
C O N T E N T S
Prefatory Note
1.The Buddha's Three-Fold Rule
2.Other Religious Views on Meat Eating
3.The Rationale for the Buddha's Rule
4.The Arguments for Vegetarianism
5.Conclusion
PREFATORY NOTE
This article originally appeared in Vîma.msâ the
Journal of the Buddhist Society of Queensland for
October 1983. It was reprinted subsequently in the
Young Buddhist (Singapore). It was later issued in the
BSQ Tracts on Buddhism series, but has been out of
print for some time. In view of the continuing
interest in this subject the booklet is being
reissued.
The opportunity has been taken to make some stylistic
changes, include some additional material and
footnotes. There has been no change in the general
argument advanced in the booklet.
1. The Buddha's Three-Fold Rule
Vegetarianism is a growing practice in modern society
and some of its-new-found enthusiasts have pointed an
accusing finger at the Buddha who is recorded as
having eaten meat, and at modern Buddhists who eat
meat. In this situation it is worthwhile examining the
attitude of the Buddha to the consumption of fish and
meat. We shall first state the Rule which the Buddha
laid down relating the consumption of fish and meat,
and then investigate the rationale for this rule.
While the Buddha's rule has been stated many times
there is very little discussion of the rationale for
this rule. It is this that the present work seeks to
address.
There is some controversy as to the exact composition
of the last meal of sûkaramaddava eaten by the Buddha,
some (following Buddhaghosa) considering it to be
pork, others (following Mahayana sources) to be
medicine or truffles. However there are other
incidents recorded where the Buddha and the early
Bhikkhus ate meat. The classic reference to this is in
the story of the "conversion" of General SŒha given in
the Vinaya Piaka (Mahâvagga, VI, 31-2). The General
had invited the Buddha and the Bhikkhus for a meal at
which meat was served. The Jains who had earlier
enjoyed the exclusive patronage of the General, now
spread the story that SŒha has a "fat beast" (thûla
pasu) killed for the occasion, and the Buddha by
knowingly partaking of its meat, had committed an act
of grave karmic consequence pâ.ticcakamma). In fact
the meat had not been specially slaughtered, but had
been purchased on the market. The Buddha took the
opportunity created by this incident to lay down the
rule governing the consumption of fish and flesh.
Addressing the monks he said: "Do not eat meat knowing
that it has been killed specially for (your) use; I
allow the use of fish and meat blameless [NOTE1] in
three ways, unseen, unheard and unsuspected" (na
bhikkave jâna.m udissakata ma.msa.m paribhunjitabba.m.
Anujânâmi bhikkave tiko.tiparisuddha.m maccama.msa.m
adi.t.ta.m asuta.m aparisankitan ti [V I 233]). We
shall refer to this rule as the Buddha's three-fold
rule on meat eating [NOTE 2]. The three conditions
postulated amount to not witnessing the actual
killing, not being told that the meat had been
specially killed (for the use of the consumer), and
even in the absence of such information not
suspecting that such was the case (i.e. the eye, ear
and mind should be satisfied as to the "blamelessness"
of the meat).
In the light of the three-fold rule the Pali texts
make a distinction between two kinds of meat, called
respectively uddissakatamasa and pavattamasa. The
former term is used to refer to meat destined for a
specific person's consumption. Such meat would not be
cleared by the three-fold rule. Although not stated so
a rough criterion which could be used to identify this
kind of meat is that the person doing the killing has
a clear notion that the meat would be consumed by a
specific person, and if that person were to consume it
that person would partake not only of the meat but
also of the karmic consequences attached to the
provision of that meat. The term used for the
other kind of which it is permissible to eat
(pavattamasa) literally means "already existing meat"
(translated by Ms Horner as "meat at hand"). There
has been some controversy as to what types of meat
would fall into this category of "already existing
meat". Some interpreters have taken it to mean
that it refers to the meat of animals killed
accidentally or killed by other animals. But in fact
it includes meat sold commercially. This is clear from
another incident in the Vinaya where the lady Suppiyâ
sends her servant to the market to fetch meat (to make
a soup for a sick monk), and is told by the servant
that "existing meat" could not be found as "today is
not a slaughter day" (n'atth'ayye pavattama.msa.m
mâghâto ajjâ ti). This shows that meat slaughtered
for
sale in the market was regarded as pavatta-masa and
therefore falling into the category of permissible
meat. This kind of meat is considered blameless
because it is karmically neutral as far as the
consumer is concerned (but not of course for the
provider of the meat who must take the full karmic
responsibility). We shall refer to the two kinds of
meat as karmically effective and karmically neutral
meat [NOTE3].
A shorter version of this incident is reported in the
Anguttara Nikâya. In the Jivakasutta of the Majjima
Nikâya the same rule is explained to Jivaka the
physician. This sutta goes to great lengths to specify
the wrong karmas that would accompany the violation of
the three-fold rule. The rule is again reiterated when
the Buddha rejected Devadatta's request to incorporate
vegetarianism into the Vinaya [NOTE 4]. It has been
reported that this rule also appears in the Vinayas of
the other early "Hinayâna" schools like the
Dharmaguptas and the Mula Sarvastavâdins (although not
in their Sutras). It can therefore be considered to be
an authentic rule of the Buddha.
The distinction between karmically effective and
karmically neutral meat is based on moral grounds.
However there are other arguments for vegetarianism;
these will be considered in Section 4 below. The
Buddha
attached some importance to at least one of these
other reasons as well. It was on this grounds that the
meat of ten kinds of living beings were prohibited.
These were: humans, elephants, horses, dogs, snakes,
lions, tigers, leopards, bears and hyenas. The texts
simple declare that such meat is "unsuitable"
(akappiya). There is no detailed discussion why these
ten species were selected for the prohibition, but one
would suspect that this was so because they were so
considered by the Public at large [NOTE5].
In view of the fact that only meat that was
"karmically neutral" was permitted to the Buddhist
community the Buddha requested that no meat should be
consumed without enquiry as to its provenance: na ca
bhikkhave appativekkhitvâ masa.m paribhunjitabba.m.
Thus ignorance was no excuse if the wrong kind had
been consumed. It was the responsibility of the
consumer to determine the suitability of meat for his
or her own consumption. These rules are specifically
laid down with respect to monks, but they have been
considered as applicable to the whole Buddhist
community, both monk and lay.
Practices in modern Theravada countries differ. By and
large in Sri Lanka only fish is served for monks
although increasing number of monks are vegetarians.
In Thailand there appears to be greater readiness to
serve meat, and it has even been rumoured that some of
this meat has been "specially slaughtered" for the use
of the monks and therefore would fall into the
category of karmically effective meat which violates
the three-fold rule of the Buddha.
2. Other Religious Views on Meat Eating
The Buddha's views on meat-eating should be put in the
context of his times. The earliest Indian religious
texts, the Vedas, did not prohibit meat eating or
the killing of animals. Indeed large scale sacrifice
became the norm, particularly the cruel ritual of the
asvamedha which gradually assumed large dimensions as
the power of the Indian rulers grew.
It was the Upanishads that introduced, at first
tentatively, the principle of non-injury (ahi.msâ)
into Indian religious life. But even here sacrifice to
the gods were permitted, though not on the scale that
it had assumed in later Vedic times. The early
Upanishads, like the Chandogya, permit the consumption
of meat, especially if part of it is offered to god.
It was only in post-Buddhist times that certain Hindu
sects adopted vegetarianism as a general rule. But the
rule was not universal and some Hindu sects, like
those following the cult of Tara, engaged in ritual
killing and consumption of meat. Most Hindus however
either became vegetarians, or at least avoided some
kinds of meat, notably beef.
It is amongst the Jains that we find the most extreme
assertion of the principle of ahi.msâ. They prohibited
the killing of all forms of life, even microscopic
organisms. Most of Jain ethics consists of a series of
rules and regulations all related to the principle of
ahi.msâ. Thus the Jain layperson's eight basic
restraints (mûlaguna) involve abstention from meat,
alcohol, honey, and five specific kinds of figs. The
last seven kinds of foods were prohibited because
they could harbour small organisms. In addition a
whole host of other rules have to be kept, e.g. not
eating after sunset (because cooking fires could
attract insects to their death) and not drinking
unfiltered water (which may contain organisms). Jain
laypersons even excluded agriculture from their
"right livelihood" occupations as agriculture too
involves destruction of life.
Many of them took to commerce and trade. The rules for
the Jain monk (muni) was even more strict, some sects
even avoiding clothing which could be destructive to
bodily parasites. Some Jain munis even undertook the
practice of fasting to death (sallekhana) because no
kind of food can be really free of harm to animals
(see the section below on the arguments for
vegetarianism).
Amongst Buddhists vegetarianism was extolled by
certain Mahayanist groups. Already in the Sanskrit
version of the Mahâparinirvâna Sutra the following
statement is attributed to the Buddha: "I order the
various disciples from today that they cannot any more
partake of meat". This statement is, of course, absent
in the Pali version of this Suttanata. It is well
known that various statements have been interpolated
into this sutta to get the Buddha's authority
posthumously. The condemnation of meat eating occurs
in other Mahayana sutras such as their version of the
Brahmajâla Sutra, and more importantly the
Lankâvatara Sutra. Chapter 8 of the latter sutra is
devoted entirely to this question, and some 24
arguments are advanced against the eating of meat.
Some representative arguments adduced against meat
eating in the Lankâvatara are:
1.present-day animals may have been one's kith and kin
in the past;
2.one's own parents and relatives may in a future life
be born as an animal;
3.there is no logic in exempting the meat of some
animals on customary grounds while not exempting all
meat;
4.meat is impure as it is always contaminated by body
wastes;
5.the prospect of being killed spreads terror amongst
animals;
6.all meat is nothing other than carrion;
7.meat eating makes the consumer to be cruel and
sensual;
8.man in not a carnivore by nature.
In this Sutra the Buddha instructs the Bodhisattva
Mahamati thus: "There is no
meat that is pure in three ways: not premeditated, not
asked for, and not impelled; therefore refrain from
eating meat".
It is clear that this is the Mahayana answer to the
Buddha's three-fold rule given in the Pali and other
"Hinayana" Canons. But the three conditions
mentioned do not coincide with the conditions
stipulated by the Buddha in the Pali suttas. In spite
of the textual criticisms of meat eating Mahayanists
have generally consumed meat in practice. This is
particularly true of Tibetan Buddhists. The Dalai Lama
has given the excuse that this is because of the
poor soil and cold climate of Tibet which is no
condusive to agriculture. But it may also be due to
tantric influences under which fish and meat and two
of
the five "M"s which tantrists indulge in.
As we have seen the Theravada School sought to adhere
to the Buddha's rule. The only notable exception was
Devadatta's schism, which the Buddha categorically
rejected even the rule of vegetarianism. However
remnants of Devadatta's schism could still be seen in
some of the tâpasa sects in Theravada [NOTE 6].
The monotheistic religions that arose in the middle
east (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) did not develop
the ethic of non-injury to animals. Both Judaism
and Islam required animal sacrifice to God, and they
also specify the way in which animals have to be
killed for human consumption (a way that is often
cruel). According to the Bible God shortly after the
Creation ordered humans to be vegetarians. This
injunction however was short-lived and was revoked
after the mythical "Flood". Now humans were allowed to
kill and eat meat with some curious restrictions
relating to the shedding of blood. This is the
Basis of the cruel method of butchery resorted to by
Jews and Muslims. The Judeo-Christian Bible sanctions
the "dominion" which God had given to animals and the
environment which has had severe consequences in
history.
It will be seen that Buddhism takes a middle position
between the Jain ahi.msâ ideal and the complete
abandon of the Judeo-Christian-Islamic position.
3. The Rationale for Buddha's Rule
What is the rationale for the Buddha's three-fold rule
on meat eating? It cannot be said that the hands of
the consumer of "karmically neutral" meat are clean,
especially if the meat is bought in the market as is
the case with most consumers of meat. For it is a rule
of the market place that without the demand there
would be no supply [NOTE 7]. At issue is the degree of
involvement with the act of killing if meat of any
sort (excepting accidentally killed animals, or those
that have died naturally) is to be consumed. We may
identify various degrees of involvement of the
consumer with the act of killing. The most direct is
where the consumer directly kills the animal whose
flesh is eaten. The second degree of involvement is
when an employee of someone under the direct power
consumer is asked to do the killing. A variant of this
degree of involvement is when consumer dines on meat
offered by a friend or a relative who in turn had
either directly killed or caused the animal to be
directly killed. Both these degrees of involvement
would fall outside the
Buddha three-fold requirement and is prohibited to the
Buddhist community. The next (third) degree of
involvement is when the consumer buys the meat on
the open market. The Buddha seems to have considered
this as satisfying the three-fold rule and it is
deemed karmically neutral. The reasons for permitting
the third degree of involvement with the act of
killing is not directly discussed in the Canon. So the
reasons for it has to be inferred from the Buddha's
position in general. It is this rationale that we hope
to supply in this section.
The relationship of this degree of involvement in
killing to the first precept of Buddhism (refraining
from the taking of life) must first be explored. Karma
adheres to acts of sovereign choice. It is true that a
butcher will only kill animals for the sale of their
meat only if there are consumers will to buy themeat.
But is so doing the butcher is making a sovereign
choice. There is no compulsion for the butcher to have
become a butcher rather than say a baker or a
candle-stick maker. If there were no persons willing
to supply the meat trade meat eaters would, if they
want to persist in their meat eating, be compelled to
do their own killing thus incurring karmic
Responsibility. It is this lack of compulsion on the
part of the consumer of the meat that really frees
this type of meat consumer from the full karmic
responsibility for the act of killing which made it
possible for this person to buy the meat in the first
place. Thus the Buddha could logically hold on to both
the first precept of Buddhism and the three-fold rule
of meat eating as not involving a logical
contradiction.
The most compelling argument for the Buddha's rule is
that the whole of samsaric existence involves some
from of killing or other. As will be shown in the next
section the supply of "vegetarian" food also involves
the destruction of life, sometimes to a greater extent
than the supply of meat products. The stark reality is
that both the vegetarian and the meat-eater by
their very existence in samsara causes the destruction
of some form of life or other. In fact it may be
impossible to live at all without the destruction of
life (as the Jain munis realised).
The fundamental point in the Buddha's teaching is that
the whole of samsâric existence involves some form of
killing. This is indeed an aspect of dukkha, the
omni-present reality. Instead of a fruitless effort to
end all forms of killing, and make the world perfect
in this respect, the Buddha laid a path to escape
from samsara and all its defects. This involves
abstaining from the grosser forms of evil, including
the consumption of "karmically effective" meat,
together with the co-development of other elements of
the Eight-Fold Path.
The Buddha stressed graver ethical defects than
meat-eating. The classic sutta in this regard is the
Amagandha Sutta in the Sutta Nipâta, one of the
earliest books of the Pali Canon. In this an unnamed
vegetarian Brahmin confronts the Buddha proclaiming
the evils of eating fish and flesh. The word âmaganda
literally means the stench of fish and meat, and is
also used to denote defilements. In his reply the
Buddha utters a number of verses listing the real
defilements that taint moral conduct. At the end of
each verse he utters the refrain: ...esâmagandho no hi
ma.msabhojana.m ("... this is the stench giving
defilement, not the consumption of meat").
The Buddha's approach is validated in Darwinian
theory. Darwin showed that all species are in constant
conflict and that only the fittest survive. According
to this the survival of any species is brought about
by the non-survival of other species that compete for
the same limited bio-space. The survival and
proliferation of mankind must necessarily involve the
destruction of countless lives irrespective of what
the diet of humans is vegetarian or non-vegetarian.
4. The Arguments for Vegetarianism
We must next examine the ethical and other
implications of vegetarianism. There are many
arguments advanced for vegetarianism amongst which the
ffollowing arguments should be considered: the moral
argument, the biological argument, the ecological
argument and the socio-cultural argument.
>From the religious point of view the moral argument is
the most important and will be considered first. Many
vegetarians relish in taking the moral high-ground.
They claim either that their diet does not involve the
killing and suffering of animals, or that even if it
does so there would be greater suffering
and animal killing if they adopted non-vegetarian
diets. Of course it is a simple fact is that
commercial agriculture, which is the basis of
vegetarian diets, cannot be undertaken without the
destruction of life. Even the very act of
tilling the ground kills many earth-bound insect life,
but the main form of killing comes from the need to
protect crops and harvests from insects, predators and
other vermin. We need only contemplate the wholesale
killing of feral pigs, rabbits, kangaroos, etc. for
this purpose, often using poison, traps, and
man-induced diseases involving cruel and horrible
deaths. The snails, grasshoppers, grubs, locusts and
other insects destroyed by powerful insecticides
number by the million. Even the number of rats killed
to save the
stored-up grain from being eaten greatly exceed the
number of cattle slaughtered to feed the meat eaters.
Indeed it could be argued that the number of animals
and insects killed to produce the average vegetarian
meal greatly exceeds the number of animals killed to
produce the a non-vegetarian meal of equal food value.
If this is so the adoption of a vegetarian diet may
actually increase the number lives lost in the food
production process.
Also many vegetarians use animal products like milk.
While it might appear that this is a "humane" food as
no killing is resorted to this may not really be
the case. Suppose that everyone gives up meat-eating
but retains milk-drinking. A consequence would be that
male calves will be killed at birth (except for a few
kept for stud purposes), unless of course the
unproductive bulls are maintained which is not likely
to happen. Milk is meant by nature for the calves, and
its forced appropriation by humans is questionable
morals. It is curious to note that some of staunchest
vegetarians like the Hare Khrishnas as also the most
addicted to the use of milk products. They not appear
to see the moral dilemma involved in their dietary
habits. The Buddha's three-fold rule, while not a
perfect one as none such exits, at least avoids the
moral conundrums that must remain to confuse the
ethically motivated vegetarian.
The biological argument for vegetarianism has greater
validity than the moral one. It may well be that the
human body is not designed to subsist on meat (as
the Lankavatara Sutra claims). The two aspects of the
human anatomy may suggest that vegetarian food is the
normal food for humans. The first is the composition
of human teeth (where molars are more important than
the incisors), and the other is the rather large ratio
of the length of the intestines to the body length in
humans. Carnivores have incisor teeth to tear the
flesh, and short intestines as the putrefying meat has
to be expelled from the body as soon as possible. The
human body is closer to that of herbivores, but not
exclusive herbivores who have a different structure to
their stomachs. In fact the human anatomy is a
compromise between the pure herbivore and the pure
carnivore - in fact it is that of an omnivore. Also
the harmful effects from the consumption of animal
products (e.g. cholesterol) are not counterbalanced by
the alleged lack of high grade protein in vegetarian
diets. On balance the biological argument seems to
favour vegetarianism over meat-eating.
The ecological argument too is in favour of
vegetarianism. Meat is a very inefficient way of
converting energy into food. It is far easier and
cheaper to convert energy into biomass that is
suitable for direct consumption by humans rather than
indirectly after feeding it to animals and then
consuming the flesh of the animals. Mass production of
livestock (chickens, pigs, cattle) would either lead
to cutting down of native forests to create grazing
lands, or under the battery method lead to great
cruelty, release of methane, etc. Selective
breeding of farm animals and use of chemicals and
hormones to enhance growth can have unexpected side
effects in other areas. But it must be mentioned that
conversion into vegetarianism will not necessarily
improve the environment ecologically. What is needed
is a decline in the population, and the adoption of
living standards that are sustainable without
environmental damage.
The socio-cultural argument involves the aesthetic
argument of what society considers fit to eat. Social
norms differ in this respect. Most societies have
ruled out cannibalism, and do not permit the
consumption of carrion and scavenging of dead animals.
In most Western countries and in the Indian
subcontinent there is a general aversion to eating
pets (dogs, cats) or reptiles. However no such
inhibitions exist in parts of Africa and the Far East
(although in China in 511 CE the Emperor Wu of Liang
prohibited the consumption of meat). Logically there
is no difference between eating one species of animal
and avoiding another. But aesthetically and culturally
there can be a significant difference. Certainly
vegetarians foods are more aesthetic than meat
products however well the latter may be dressed up to
be.
5. Conclusion
The foregoing argument should not be taken as a
justification of meat-eating. Our concern is to
speculate on the rationale behind the three-fold rule
on this subject enunciated by the Buddha and to refute
the charge that the Buddha's rule involves a moral
contradiction with the other parts of the Buddha's
teaching such as his insistence on loving-kindness and
the precept on the taking of life.
There are many compelling arguments for vegetarianism,
the most important of these being the biological,
ecological and social arguments we have identified in
the previous section. The moral argument on which many
vegetarians adopt to claim to a morality which is even
higher than that taught by the Buddha has been shown
to be invalid. In fact if people were to switch
over from meat-eating to vegetarianism there will not
necessarily be a reduction in the amount of killing
and cruelty involved in the provision of food. Only
different kinds of animals are likely to suffer.
There is also another interesting moral point to
resolve. Most of the animals killed for human
consumption are deliberately bred for this purpose
(e.g. chickens, pigs and cattle). If there were no
demand for their meat the animals would not simply
exist. Thus abolition of meat eating will not in the
long run "save" any animals as these animals will
simply not be reared. The problem is whether it is
morally preferable for some animals to be kept alive
for a limited period rather than not allow them to
exist at all. Without meat consumers most of the
animals not slaughtered for food would not have
existed at all. We shall not examine the moral
conundrum involved in this question.
The Buddha's requirement was for moderation in eating
(matta¤¤uta ca bhattasmi). Whether vegetarian or meat
diets are used eating should be restricted to the
minimum that is necessary to keep the bodily functions
going. The Vinaya rule of not eating after mid-day may
be related to this rule of moderation in consumption.
But however careful one may be in the matter of
diet, there is no way to keep one's body going in a
material sense that does not cause harm to some other
organism. The interdependence between organisms
ensures that the survival of any one species - even
the human species - must involve the destruction of
other forms of life.
Even though there is no blanket proscription on meat
eating in the Buddha's teaching the three-fold rule
that he enunciated has considerable value. The
Buddha was concerned with devising a practical rule
that will reconcile the dilemma involved in living in
samsara and allowing other life forms too to exist.
The fact that the three-fold rule is not ideal is not
a reflection on the Buddha but of the existential fact
that samsâra-faring must involve harm to others. The
Buddha's final solution to this is perhaps the only
way in which this problem could be satisfactorily
solved. This solution is to chart a course to get out
of phenomenal existence, i.e. chart a path to Nibbâna.
NOTES
1. The term parisuddha is best translated as
"blameless" rather than the more literal "pure" which
is the rendition favoured by Horner (who translated
the Vinaya for the Pali Text Society). It is the
karmic quality of the meat that is
important, not its purity in other respects.
2. The word "meat" will be used to designate all forms
of food derived from animals whether they fish, flesh
or fowl. From the ethico-moral perspective
there is no essential difference between these various
form of flesh.
3. The relationship of meat-eating to karma is not
specifically made by the Buddha. The distinction we
have made should be treated with care. Even the
consumption of what we have termed-"non-karmically
effective" meat can have adverse karmic effects
depending on the thought moments that accompany the
consumption of that meat. What is meant however is
that the consumption of what we have called
"karmically effective meat" will always
have adverse karmic consequences, while the other kind
of meat may have adverse consequence. In neither case
can there be any good karmic effects.
4. The rule of vegetarianism was the fifth of a list
of rules which Devadatta had proposed to the Buddha.
Devadatta was the founder of the tâpasa movement in
Buddhism and his special rules involved ascetic and
austere practices (forest-dwelling, wearing only rags,
etc). The Buddha rejected all the proposed revisions
of Devadatta, and it was in this context that he
reiterated the tikoiparisuddha rule. (On this see the
author's Western Buddhism and a Theravâda heterodoxy,
BSQ Tracts on Buddhism.
5. In general the Buddha tended to accept currently
prevailing social customs unless there was a direct
conflict with the Dhammic principles. In this case
there was no need to change current practices. It is
interesting to note that the ten kinds of animals does
not include the ox or cow. This was later to become
of one of the greatest taboos of Hinduism. Perhaps at
the time of this Buddha this aspect of Hinduism had
not developed the importance that it was later to
assume.
6. On this see the present writer's Western Buddhism
and a Theravada Heterodoxy, BSQ Tracts on Buddhism
Series.
7. The argument that the animal is already dead when
its meat is bought is not a valid one. Most butchers
and meat shops sell out of stocks they hold. When
a sale is made the seller orders more stock to replace
the item sold. Thus when an already dead chicken is
bought an order is sent out to kill another
chicken to replace the one sold.
Source: The Buddhist Society of Queensland Home Page,
http://www.uq.net.au/slsoc/budsoc.html
http://www.saigon.com/~anson/ebud/ebdha069.htm